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Article 6

NOTES
EDELMAN V. JORDAN: A NEW STAGE IN ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT EVOLUTION
I. Introduction
Edelman v. Jordan,' decided by the United States Supreme Court in March
of 1974, culminated a series of decisions concerning the administration of federally funded welfare programs by various states.2 In its holding, the Court
reversed an apparent trend of affirming lower court decisions ordering retroactive
payment of welfare benefits wrongfully withheld by states.3 In so doing, the
Court also provided new insight into the broader issue of state immunity from
suits in federal court, as based on the eleventh amendment' and its subsequent
judicial extension in Hans v. Louisiana.5 Since this broader issue involves elements of constitutional history and interpretation, conflicting and ambiguous
precedent, modem concepts of federalism, and the moral responsibilities of
government, Edelman deserves searching and critical examination.
II. Edelman: The Lower Courts
Edelman v. Jordan began as a class action suit for declaratory and injunctive relief against Illinois and Cook County6 officials, alleging that they were
administering the joint federal-state program of Aid to the Aged, Blind and Disabled7 in a manner contrary to federal regulations8 and thereby were violating
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.9 The District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois held that the Illinois regulations 0 followed
by the defendants contradicted the controlling federal regulations11 and were,
consequently, invalid. As a result, the lower court enjoined the defendants from
1 415 U.S. 651 '(1974).
2 Swank v. Rodriguez, 403 U.S. 901 (1971), aff'g 318 F. Supp. 289 (N.D.IUl. 1970);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (Arizona, Pennsylvania); Wyman v. Boddie, 402
U.S. 991 (1971), aff'g 434 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1970) (New York); Wyman v. Rosado, 402
U.S. 991 (1971), aff'g 437 F.2d 619 (2d Cir. 1970) (New York); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S.
309 (1971) (New York); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (Maryland); Rosado v.
Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970) (New York); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (New
York); Wyman v. Bowens, 397 U.S. 49 (1970), aff'g 304 F.Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1969);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (Connecticut, Pennsylvania, District of Columbia); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (Alabama).
3 Sterrett v. Mothers and Children's Rights Organization, 409 U.S. 809 '(1972); State
Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Zarate, 407 U.S. 918 (1972); Wyman v.
Bowens, 397 U.S. 49 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
4 U.S. Const. amend. XI provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
5 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
6 Cook County is the Illinois county wherein Chicago is located.
7 Act of July 25, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 141(a), 76 Stat. 197.
8 45 C.F.R. § 206.10 (1973).
9 Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 987-88 (7th Cir. 1973).
10 ILL. DEP'T oF PuBLIc Am, Categorical Assistance Manual §§ 4004.1, 8255.
11 45 C.F.R. § 206.10 (1973).
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further violations of federal standards and, additionally, ordered payment of
wrongfully withheld benefits to the plaintiffs. 2
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court, rejecting the contention by the defendants-appellants that the eleventh
amendment 3 barred the award of retroactive benefits. 4 The court of appeals
rebutted this argument by citing four decisions, each affirmed in the Supreme
Court, wherein the same eleventh amendment defense to retroactive welfare
payments had been rejected. 5 It added that "even if an independent analysis
were open to us, we would hold the defendants' contentions to be without
merit."'" Certiorari was granted" to resolve the conflict which had arisen between the Seventh Circuit, because of its decision in Edelman, and the Second
Circuit' 9 on the issue of retroactive payment of welfare benefits by a state
agency.'
III. Edelman: The Supreme Court
By a five-to-four vote, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the
Seventh Circuit affirming the order of retroactive benefits and remanded the
case." The majority opinion, written by Justice Rehnquist, discussed four
issues which bore on the question of retroactive benefits: (1) whether state
immunity extends beyond the eleventh amendment to suits by a citizen against
his own state; (2) whether state immunity applies to suits wherein the state
is not a named defendant; (3) whether retroactive benefits are permitted by
Ex parte Young's exception to state immunity; (4) whether Illinois waived its
immunity by participating in the Aid to the Aged, Blind and Disabled program.
A. The Hans Extension of State Immunity
Beyond the Eleventh Amendment
Read literally, the eleventh amendment does not bar suits such as Edelman,
brought in a federal forum by a citizen against his own state.2 ' Nevertheless, a
long line of Supreme Court cases has held that such suits are barred unless the
defendant state consents, although the rationale for this rule is often unclear.
Some cases have held that the eleventh amendment itself prohibits suits in federal
court against a state by one of its citizens.2 2 However, the cases cited in Edel-

man on this point acknowledged that such suits are not literally barred by the

12 Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d at 988.
13 See note 4 supra for text.
14 472 F.2d at 989-95.
15 See cases cited at note 3 supra.
16 472 F.2d at 990.
17 Sub nom. Edelman v. Jordan, 412 U.S. 937-38 '(1973).
18 Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1972).
19 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 658.
20 Id. at 658-59.
21 See note 4 supra.
22 Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945); Missouri v. Fiske,
290 U.S. 18 (1933).
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eleventh amendment." Resting on these decisions, the Edelman Court rejected
the view that a federal suit by a citizen against his own state is within the eleventh
amendment prohibition. The Court argued that such suits are barred by the
intent of the authors of the Constitution that the states retain their immunity
from suit. A lengthy footnote supporting this view is included in the Edelman
opinion. 4 However, this view, when judged in the light of constitutional history, appears to be incorrect.
When the Supreme Court first considered the question in 1793, it decided
in Chisholm v. Georgia'5 that the federal courts had jurisdiction over a suit
against the state of Georgia by a citizen of a different state." Ratification of
the eleventh amendment five years later overturned Chisholm, the wording of
the amendment evidencing this narrow purpose.2" The most recent study of
this question agrees with the Chisholm decision that the states were not immune
from federal suits before the eleventh amendment." After considering the Constitution's history, including the material subsequently examined in the Edelman
footnote,29 this study found that there was no consensus at the time the Constitution was ratified that the states would retain their immunity from suits in
federal court by citizens of other states or of foreign countries. On the contrary,
the consensus seems to have been that the states might be sued in federal court
without their consent 0
Significantly, Hans u. Louisiana, which extended the eleventh amendment
prohibition to suits by citizens against their own state, relied on the doubtful
conclusion that the framers of the Constitution intended the states to retain their
immunity."' Edelman cited Hans and three other cases which either adopted
the same rational&2 or simply cited Hans and its progeny."2 Thus, the conclusion
reached in Edelman, that states are immune from suits in federal court by their
own citizens, rests on impugnable precedent. The difficulty with this initial
issue foreshadows the legal and conceptual complexity surrounding the other
eleventh amendment questions considered in Edelman.
23 Employees v. Dep't of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 280 (1973); Parden
v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 186 (1964); Duhne v. New Jersey, 251 U.S. 311, 313 (1920);
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. at 10. The fifth case cited in Edelman on this point, Great
Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 48 (1944), involved a suit by a foreign corporation against a state and therefore falls within the language of the eleventh amendment.
24 415 U.S. at 660-62 n.9.
25 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
26 Id.
27 The eleventh amendment begins: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend . . . ." The complete text of the amendment is set out at note 4 supra.
The amendment is worded to prohibit an otherwise permissible interpretation of the Constitu-

tion, rather than to add new substantive provisions as most other amendments do.
28 0. JACOBs, THE ELEVENTH
after cited as C. JAcoBs].

29
30
31

AMENDMENT

AND

SOVEREIGN

IMMUNITY

(1972)

[herein-

Id. at 34-37.
Id. at 40.
As stated in Hans:
Any such power as that of authorizing the federal judiciary to entertain suits by
individuals against the States, had been expressly disclaimed, and even resented, by
the great defenders of the Constitution whilst it was on its trial before the American
people. 134 U.S. at 12.
32 Duhne v. New Jersey, 251 U.S. at 313.
33 Employees v. Dep't of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. at 280; Parden v. Terminal
Ry., 377 U.S. at 186.
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B. State Immunity When the State Is Not a Named Defendant
Having concluded that sovereign immunity extends beyond the eleventh
amendment, the Court then inquired whether sovereign immunity also extended
beyond the face of the pleadings. Since the complaint in Edelman did not
name Illinois as a defendant, the action was not formally "against one of the
United States," in the words of the eleventh amendment. Originally, the Court
had relied on the words of the amendment to determine if a suit was against a
state. In Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 4 Chief Justice Marshall ruled
that the eleventh amendment applied only when a state is a party of record 5
This standard was soon rejected, however3
The Edelman Court cited Ford
Motor Company v. Department of Treasury7 for the modem rule that the state
is a real party in interest, and thus can invoke its sovereign immunity "when
the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state.""
Additionally, the Court cited Kennecott Copper Corporation v.State Tax
Commission" and Great Northern Life Insurance Company v. Read,40 two
cases which had adopted the Ford Motor Company rationale. But in Kennecott
the Court emphasized that it, Ford Motor Company and Read all involved
state taxation, 4' an area which the Supreme Court42 and Congress4 3 have historically regarded as inappropriate for federal interference. Thus, the cases
cited by the Edelman Court, although they generally support the view that
judges will look beyond the pleadings to determine if a state is a real partydefendant, are arguably distinguishable because they each involved the sensitive
area of state taxation which was not at issue in Edelman.
C. Ex Parte Young's Exception to State Immunity
1. The Young Exception
The Court then considered whether the action fell under the exception to
sovereign immunity provided by Ex parte Young. 4 In Young, decided in 1908,
the Supreme Court had held that despite a claim of sovereign immunity, a state
34 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 737 (1824).
35 Id. at 856.
36 Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110, 123 (1828); The Court seemed
to return to the Osborn rule in Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 203, 220 (1872); but later
cases clearly indicated that the Court rejected the Osborn standard. See, e.g., Reagan v.
Farmers? Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 388-89 (1894); Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140
U.S. 1, 10 (1891); Inre Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 487 '(1887).
37 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
38 Id. at 464, quoted in Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663.
39 327 U.S. 573 (1946).
40 322 U.S. 47 (1944).
41 The Kennecott opinion observes:
The reason underlying the rule [requiring state consent to being sued in federal
court] is the right of a State to reserve for its courts the primary consideration and
decision of its own tax litigation because of the direct impact of such litigation upon
its finances. 327 U.S. at 577.
42 Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 126-27 (1970) (Brennan, J.. concurring).
43 Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 542 n.6 (1971). See 28 U.S.C. § 1341

(1970).
44

209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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officer could be enjoined by a federal court from acting pursuant to an unconstitutional state statute.45 The Court reasoned that an officer acting under an
unconstitutional state statute loses his status as a representative of the state and
becomes liable as an individual for his actions." This view, which actually
appeared before Young,47 has since been reaffirmed on numerous occasions."
Obviously, the Young rule rests on a legal fiction. It pretends that a suit
to enjoin a state officer from acting as the state commands him is not a suit
against the state.49 Despite the beneficial results of this fiction,50 it has produced
anomalous results as well. One example would be a suit against a state officer
for allegedly violating the fourteenth amendment. To invoke the fourteenth
amendment, the plaintiff must argue that the officer's acts constituted state
action. 1 To avoid the immunity barrier, however, the court would have to
assume under the Young fiction that the officer's acts were not state action.
Thus, the same act might be simultaneously considered both state action and
nonstate action."2
A more critical anomaly arises from the necessary limitation of the Young
fiction. The fiction is discarded when a judgment nominally against a state
official would reach the state itself, either by requiring affirmative action by that
state53 or, more specifically, by requiring the state to spend money from its
5 4
treasury.
2. Young's Application to Edelman
Edelman rests precisely on the latter ground. As explained by Justice Rehnquist, since the lower court's award of retroactive benefits would necessarily be
paid by Illinois, the situation resembled more closely Ford Motor Company,
where monetary damages against the state were denied, than it did Ex parte
Young, where injunctive relief against the state was granted. 5 So a critical
distinction lies between the prospective relief allowed in Young and the monetary relief disallowed in Ford Motor Company. If the effect of the relief sought
45 Id. at 155-56. An injunction is also available where the statute is constitutional on its
face but unconstitutional in operation. See, e.g., Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 393
(1932); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Tafoya, 270 U.S. 426, 434 (1926); Green v. Louisville &
Interurban R.R., 244 U.S. 499, 507 (1917); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S.
at 390-91; Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 295 (1885).
46 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60.
47 See, e.g., Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516, 530 (1899); Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140
U.S. at 10; Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. at 288.
48 See, e.g., Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 304 (1952); Sterling
v. Constantin, 287 U.S. at 393; Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 37 (1915); Western Union Tel.
Co. v. Andrews, 216 U.S. 165, 166 (1910).
49 Davis, Suing the Government by Falsely Pretending to Sue an Officer, 29 U. CH. L.
REv. 435 (1962): "The courts do not violate the doctrine of sovereign immunity except in
substance." Id.
50 415 U.S. at 664.
51 U.S. Const. amend. XIV provides in part: "No State shall make or enforce any
law . . . nor shall any State deprive any person ....
"
52 See, e.g., Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 '(1913).
53 Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 691 n.11 (1949); Land
v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738 (1947).
54 Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. at 738. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
55 415 U.S. at 665.
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would be to deplete the state's treasury, it is barred by state immunity. On this
basis, Justice Rehnquist rejected the court of appeals' denomination of the award
of retroactive benefits in Edelman as "equitable restitution,"5 8 arguing that
Young does not allow any form of relief which may be called "equitable."5 7
3. Criticism of Edelman's Analysis of Young
The case law lends uncertain support to the Edelman Court's view that
Young does not allow an award of retroactive benefits against the state. In
Young itself, the Court commented that affirmative relief may be available
when a state officer refuses to perform a purely ministerial duty.58 Porter v.
Warner Holding Company"9 went beyond Young by stating that once a court
acquires jurisdiction, it "has the power . . . to award complete relief."' In
words even more applicable to Edelman, Sterling V. Constantin6' held that
federal courts can award "appropriate relief" against state officials who violate
62
the constitutional rights of citizens.

These decisions63 cast doubt on the view that the Young fiction cannot
accommodate affirmative or monetary relief. Under these cases, it is difficult
to understand how the form of relief can make any difference. If the doctrine
of state immunity is a limitation on federal court jurisdiction, as it appears to
be,6" then once the Young fiction is employed to grant federal jurisdiction, the
form of relief sought or granted should not destroy that jurisdiction.
Even assuming that the form of relief can affect jurisdiction, a more
troubling question arises. The purpose of state immunity from federal suit has
been alternately stated as either the prevention of interference with state treasuries and governmental functions65 or the protection of states from the "indignity" of "the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private
parties."66 Yet these supposed evils are realized whether the relief granted is
monetary, injunctive, or both. The majority in Edelman admitted that injunctive relief may severely affect a state's treasury,6" echoing Justice Douglas' observation in dissent that "the nature of the impact on the state treasury is precisely
the same" whether the Court grants both retroactive and prospective relief or
prospective relief alone.6
As this passage noted, prospective and retroactive relief would affect the
Illinois treasury in the same way, in that each would deplete it. The only differ56
57
58
59

472 F.2d
415 U.S.
209 U.S.
328 U.S.

at 994.
at 666.
at 158.
395 (1946).

60 Id. at 399.
61 287 U.S. 378 (1932).
62 Id. at 393.
63 See also Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 67-70 (1897); Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140
U.S. at 10.

64 But see Illinois CJ.lR. v. Adams, 180 U.S. 28, 37-38 (1901).
65

Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. at 738.

66 In re Ayers, 123 U.S. at 505.
67 415 U.S. at 667, citing Grfifln v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218. 233 (1964),

where a district court was authorized, under Ex parte Young, to order the levy of taxes to
reopen and operate racially nondiscriminatory schools.

68 415 U.S. at 682.
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ence between these forms of relief would be that retroactive relief would award
the back benefits claimed by the plaintiff-respondent, while prospective relief
would not do so. Surely this difference would be inconsequential compared to
the potential effects of the injunctive relief requested and ultimately granted.
Yet the majority called the fiscal effects of the injunction "ancillary," in contrast to the retroactive benefits which were styled "a form of compensation" that
"will to a virtual certainty be paid from state funds."69
Thus, the test for determining what relief will lie against a state is, in reality,
not whether the relief will reach the state treasury. Nor can it be viewed to
depend on the extent to which the state treasury will be affected. If it did, the
Court in Edelman would have granted the monetary relief and denied the injunctive relief. Despite Justice Rehnquist's protest against overemphasis on the
label "equitable," 70 the rule of Edelman must be regarded as permitting relief
against a state if the court chooses to call the relief "equitable" or "prospective"
but not if it calls the relief "damages" or "retroactive."
D. Waiver of Immunity
The last major issue decided by the Court was whether Illinois, by participating in the Aid to the Aged, Blind and Disabled program, had waived its immunity from federal suit. The court of appeals thought it had. It argued that 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1970),"1 its jurisdictional counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)
(1970) ,7 and HEW regulations73 providing for federal payment under federal
court order had by implication created a cause of action against participating
states. In affirming the lower court, the court of appeals concluded "that Congress fully meant to condition the grant of federal funds on the states' being susceptible to a federal court suit to obtain retrospective relief."7
In its response, the Supreme Court first considered two cases relied on by the
69
70
71

72

73

74

Id. at 668.
Id. at 666. See text accompanying note 57 supra.
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized
by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights
of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.
45 C.F.R. § 205.10 (1973) provides:
'(b) Federal financial participation is available for the following items.
(2) Payments of assistance made to carry out hearing decisions, or to take corrective action after an appeal but prior to hearing, or to extend the benefit of a hearing
decision or court order to others in the same situation as those directly affected by
the decision or order. Such payments may be retroactive in accordance with applicable Federal policies on corrective payments.
(3) Payments of assistance within the scope of Federally aided public assistance
programs made in accordance with a court order.
472 F.2d at 995.
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75
court of appeals: Parden v. Terminal Railway
and Petty v.Tennessee-Missouri
Bridge Commission."' Parden held that Alabama, by operating an interstate
railroad, consented to suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act,7 which
purported to cover "[e]very common carrier," 8 even though the Alabama constitution expressly asserted the state's immunity from suit."9 Parden established
the rule that "when a State leaves the sphere that is exclusively its own and
enters into activities subject to congressional regulation, it subjects itself to that
regulation as fully as if it were a private person or corporation.""0
Petty held that an interstate commission 8 was amenable to federal suit
under the Jones Act82 despite claims of sovereign immunity. Congress had approved the compact 3 with the proviso that it would not "affect ... [the] jurisdiction . .. of any court ... ."'I Even after noting that a waiver of immunity
cannot be lightly inferred,"5 Petty found that the states had clearly waived their
immunity by accepting the compact.8 "
The Edelman Court distinguished Parden and Petty, finding that they both
contained "the threshold fact of congressional authorization to sue a class of
defendants which literally includes States ... ."s' Arguably, such congressional
authorization was not readily apparent in Parden and Petty. In Parden, authorization was found in the words "every common carrier. " In Petty, authorization
was found in an interstate compact which, according to Congress, did not "affect
... [the] jurisdiction... of any court ... ,"9 In addition, the Court also cited
Murray v. Wilson Distilling Company9" for the rule that waiver of immunity
will be found only where stated "by the most express language or by such overwhelming implication from the text as would leave no room for any other reasonable construction."'" If this were in fact the rule, neither Parden nor Petty
could pass muster. But Murray does not actually go so far. It applied this rule
not to determine whether a state had waived its immunity from a suit, as Edelman indicated, but to interpret a state statute which allegedly divested the state
of its rights in certain assets.9 2
To further buttress its position on the issue of implied waiver of immunity,
the Court then quoted Great Northern Life Insurance Company v. Read for the

75 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
76 359 U.S. 275 (1959).
77 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1970).
78 Id. at 51.
79 ALA. CONST. art. I, § 14: "That the State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant
in any court of law or equity."
80 377 U.S. at 196.
81 Creation of the interstate commission was authorized by the General Bridge Act of
1946, 33 U.S.C. §§ 525-34 (1970). The commission was created by the joint acts of the legislatures of Tennessee, Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 167-68 (1949), and Missouri, Mo. Laws 622 (1949).
82 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
83 Act of Oct. 26, 1949, ch. 758, 63 Stat. 930.
84 Id.
85 359 U.S. at 276.
86 Id. at 280.
87 415 U.S. at 672.
88 45 U.S.C. § 51 [emphasis added].
89 63 Stat. 930. See text accompanying note 84 supra.
90 213 U.S. 151 (1909).
91 Id. at 171, cited at 415 U.S. at 673.
92 213 U.S. at 170-71.
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rule that interference with state fiscal affairs would be justified only after "a
clear declaration of the state's intention to submit its fiscal problems to other
courts than those of its own creation."93 However, in Read the Court was considering whether a state's consent to suit in its own courts implied consent to
suit in federal courts as well. 4 This is a far different question from whether
Congress had conditioned state participation in a federally funded welfare
program on the states' waiver of immunity to suit in federal court, the question
posed in Edelman.
Thus, the authorities cited by the Court on the waiver question, Murray and
Read, did not in fact address that specific question. Moreover, no clear rule
emerges from those cases which are pertinent to that question. Petty, quoted by
the Court, cautioned that a waiver cannot be lightly inferred. 5 Ohio v. Helvering," in finding Ohio a "person" subject to excise taxation under 26 U.S.C. §
205 (1939), demonstrated greater willingness to infer congressional intent to
dispense with state immunity. United States v. United Mine Workers9" relied on
the "old and well-known rule" against statutorily depriving the sovereign of
rights and privileges unless the statute expressly so provides.9 9 But on a similar
question, United States v. Shaw4 ' ° ruled that "[w]hen authority is given [to sue
the United States], it is liberally construed."''
Edelman did little to reconcile these cases, leaving the rule governing waiver
of immunity unsettled.
IV. Alternatives to Edelman
Edelman v. Jordan and its inevitable repercussions0 2 will surely support
Justice Frankfurter's caveat in his dissent to Read that sovereign immunity "undoubtedly runs counter to modern democratic notions of the moral responsibility
of the State."'0 3 Proceeding on this assumption, commentators have suggested
several alternatives to the present scope of state immunity.
One alternative suggested is not to read the eleventh amendment as a prohibition of suits under federal question jurisdiction.'
This suggestion is
grounded on the assertion that the narrow purpose of the eleventh amendment
was to prevent suits under diversity jurisdiction against several states on the large
93
94

322 U.S. at 54, quoted at 415 U.S. at 673.
322 U.S. at 54.

95

359 U.S. at 276.

96 292 U.S. 360 (1934).
97 Id. Ohio v. Helvering dealt with state immunity from federal taxation, not federal
judicial process, but the areas are analogous. If Illinois were considered a "person" under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, as Ohio was under 26 U.S.C. § 205, its immunity from federal suit would be
effectively destroyed. For other cases which avoided state immunity from federal taxation, see
United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936), and South Carolina v. United States, 199
U.S. 437 (1905).
98 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
99 Id. at 272.
100 309 U.S. 495 (1940).
101 Id. at 501.
102 See, e.g., Adams v. Harden, 493 F.2d 21 (5th Cir. 1974).
103 322 U.S. at 59.
104 Comment, Monetary Remedies Against the State in Federal Question Cases, 68 Nw.
U.L. REv. 544, 557, 562-64 (1973).
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0 5
debts they had accumulated prior to the enactment of the amendment."
Despite the questionable historical accuracy of this assertion,l"s it implicitly
recognizes that the federal government should be able to control areas where
federal law and federal policy dominate. The same consideration lay beneath
the Pardenholding that states which engage in "activities subject to congressional
regulation" impliedly waive their immunity from suit." 7
Another alternative proposed is that the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins "
be adapted to the immunity area." 9 Specifically, this would require that state
immunity apply only to state created rights, leaving the federal courts free to
enforce federally created rights against the states.' A third alternative advocated
that the eleventh amendment be narrowly read to prohibit only common law
claims against states."' To the extent that common law claims are state created,
and therefore not federal questions, this alternative resembles closely the preceding two proposals and reflects the same policy of federal dominance in federal
areas.
As these three suggestions imply, the fundamental problem with state immunity is that it allows the states to contravene with impunity federal policy in
areas ostensibly under federal control. Justice Marshall recognized this in his
dissent to Edelman by commenting that without retroactive remedies, "state welfare officials have everything to gain and nothing to lose by failing to comply
with the congressional mandate." In Edelman itself, as Justice Marshall explained, Illinois officials had withheld welfare benefits since 1968 by arguing
that the federal regulation they were violating was invalid, an argument "which
even the majority deems unworthy of discussion."" 2
The three proposals discussed above, while they illuminate the problem of
state immunity in federally controlled areas, would require repeal or revision of
the eleventh amendment, events which are unlikely. Barring this and barring any
wholesale waiver of immunity by the states,"' no easy solution to the broad
problem of state immunity exists. The solution implicit within the three alter14
natives examined above and in Parden"
involves a balancing of federal and

105 Id. at 561 n.84 and accompanying text.
106 C. JACoBs, supra note 28, disputes this premise. He points out that by 1794 the federal
government had assumed over two-thirds of the states' debts, that the states were willing and
able to pay the rest, and that most were in fact paid during the period 1790-1810. Drawing on
these facts, he concludes that the evidence does not support the conclusion that the eleventh
amendment was intended to relieve the states of existing debts. Id. at 69-70.
107 377 U.S. at 196.
108 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
109 Cullison, Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment (A Case of the White Knight's
Green Whiskers), 5 HouSTON L. Rnv. 1 (1967).
110 Id. at 19.
111 Comment, A Practical View of the Eleventh Amendment - Lower Court Interpretations and the Supreme Court's Reaction, GO. L. J. 1473, 1499 (1973).
112 415 U.S. at 692. The argument Justice Marshall was referring to was the contention,
dismissed by the majority at 659-60 n.8, that the time limits set by the HEW regulations
appearing at 45 C.F.R. § 206.10 (a) (3) were inconsistent with the requirement of §

1602 (a) (8), 76 Stat. 197, that aid be furnished "with reasonable promptness," and so were
invalid.
113 Only one state, Montana, has absolutely waived its immunity from suit. MONT. CONST.
art. 2, § 18. Illinois has completely waived its immunity but subject to later modification and
limitation by the state legislature. ILL. CONST. art. 13, § 4.
114 See text accompanying note 107 supra.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[February 19751

state priorities in specific problem areas. Such an approach would confront the
5
Court with the same type of task it faced in Helvering u. Gerhardt," where it
sought to balance the conflicting interests of federal and state government in
defining the limits of state tax immunity. There, the Court denied state tax immunity because to honor it would "restrict the federal taxing power" without
providing the state any tangible protection in return."
Similarly, state immunity from federal judicial process should be denied
when it would place an unwarranted burden on the implementation of federal
policy without affording tangible protection to the state. Under this rule, the
artificial distinction between prospective and retrospective relief would lose
all importance. Instead, courts considering cases such as Edelman would ask
three questions:
1. Is this an area where federal law and policy should dominate?
2. Would observance of state immunity destroy the federal government's
ability to enforce its law and policy?
3. Do these two considerations outweigh the state's need for protection from
liability?
If a court answered all three questions affirmatively, the state would be subject
to suit in federal court. If not, the state's immunity would bar the suit.
V. Conclusion
From the standpoint of precedent and logic, the decision in Edelman V.
Jordan is unsatisfactory. It rests on ambiguous, doubtful precedent and tenuous
reasoning. But the failure of the Court should not be ascribed to its present
members. The entire history of the eleventh amendment has been and remains
ambiguous and uncertain; the Edelman opinion is merely a product of that
history. Despite this history, however, it remains useful to consider what the
Court should have decided.
Edelman's reception will ultimately depend on the political philosophy of its
audience. To those who support state independence and decry federal involvement in matters arguably under the states' province, Edelman is a significant
step forward. It resolves in clear terms the problem of what relief Young authorizes against the states. After Edelman, states need no longer fear that their
treasuries will be exhausted and their financial plans disrupted by some failure,
intentional or otherwise, to observe the letter of federal law."' Moreover, states
can still individually waive their immunity if they wish," leaving other states to
do as they wish. So on these grounds, the Edelman opinion might well be applauded.
But to those who believe that the federal government should bear primary
115 304 U.S. 405 (1938).
116 Id. at 420.
117 The fact that the two states listed in note 113 supra which have wholly or partly
waived their immunity from suit have not yet suffered serious financial disruption may indicate that fears such as these are unfounded.
118 See note 113 supra.
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responsibility for the well-being of its citizens, Edelman erects substantial
obstacles. These obstacles can be overcome either by overruling Edelman, legislatively or judicially, or by avoiding its effects. The three alternatives discussed
above are proposals to overrule Edelman by the unlikely routes of repeal or
revision of the eleventh amendment itself. Equally remote is the chance that
the Court will overrule Edelman, since the decision generally follows the trend
of past eleventh amendment cases.
In contrast, avoiding the effects of Edelman, either legislatively or judicially,
may provide more feasible although more limited solutions. The federal government could easily resolve the Edelman dilemma by requiring that each state,
as a condition to its participation in a federally funded program, waive its immunity in suits arising from its administration of that program.
But the "modem democratic notions of the moral responsibility of the
State" to which Justice Frankfurter" 9 referred are not inherently or logically
limited to federally funded programs. More broadly, lower courts could
eviscerate Edelman by limiting it to its facts or distinguishing it as a case involving welfare laws, a joint federal-state program, or on any other grounds.
Lower courts may also attempt to limit the Edelman holding by arguing that it
concerned common law immunity, not eleventh amendment immunity, since the
case did not fall within the precise language of the amendment.
But Justice
Rehnquist's broadly worded opinion may well work to frustrate such lower
court efforts. The holding is not limited to the facts of the case, and it certainly
does not rest on any distinction between common law and eleventh amendment
immunity. The inevitable conclusion is that Edelman, in contrast to the eleventh
amendment itself, means exactly what it says, that the states cannot be compelled by federal courts to compensate those whose federal rights they violate.
David Bottger

119 Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. at 59.
120 See parts III. A. and B. supra.

